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I.  INTRODUCTION: TALKING AND TEXTING 
We can talk or we can text. 
What do I mean by that?  We can talk—we can have a conversation.  
He says, she says, I say, you say.  We can text—we can write it down 
and send it off, preferably by Instant Messenger, or email, for sure, 
but also by snail mail, op/ed, or law review article.  We can text by 
rule, by statute, by opinion, or even by constitution.  That is what this 
is about—constitutional texting.  Let us look at constitutional texting 
in the context of Steve Smith‟s discussion of how the law means in 
Law’s Quandary.1 
We can talk or we can text. 
 
 * © 2006 Lawrence B. Solum.  Permission is hereby granted to duplicate this 
paper for scholarly or teaching purposes, including permission to reproduce multiple 
copies or post on the Internet, and to quote extended passages in scholarly work, 
including casebooks and anthologies, subject only to the requirement that this 
copyright notice, the title of the Article, and the name of the Author be prominently 
included in the copy or extended excerpt. 
 ** John E. Cribbet Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.  
This one is for Rogers Albritton.  I have never had a better teacher.  I have never met 
anyone smarter.  I‟m still in awe.  Without Rogers, I would not have written this. 
 1. See STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW‟S QUANDARY (2004). 
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How do we mean by talking?  Suppose we talk.  We utter some 
words, maybe in the form of complete sentences, maybe not.  When 
we talk, we say and we mean.  What we say might be what we mean.  
We might say what we mean, but we might not.  Suppose we say in 
sentences.  Our sentences have meanings—meanings in plain English; 
sentence meanings.  But what we mean by our sentences is not 
necessarily what the sentences mean in plain English.  Later on in this 
essay I am going to say, “Here is the roadmap.”  But I will not refer to 
a map of any road.  No roads.  No maps.  But you will understand 
what I mean.  You will know that the roadmap is no map of a road.  It 
is an outline of the article.  Oops.  Not exactly an outline, but like an 
outline.  A roadmap.  You know what I mean. 
When we talk, we can say one thing but mean another.  I can say 
“roadmap” and mean, well, you know.  Or at least most of you know.  
Some of you may have never read a law review article before, but you 
have read essays and know about roadmaps.  Or you can guess.  Even 
if you could not guess, by now you would know that what I said is not 
exactly what I meant. 
Someone asks me to evaluate a former student.  I say, “She 
regularly attended class, and asked lots of questions.”  What do I 
mean?  You know what I mean.  You know that I mean that she was a 
mediocre student.  Oh, and I knew you would know.  That is why I 
said it.  In fact, now that you know what I meant, you may be 
thinking, “She must be terrible.”  Why would you be thinking that?  
You would be making an inference from what I did say and what I 
did not say.  I was asked for an evaluation.  I did not say, “She was an 
excellent student.”  I did not say, “She was a good student.”  I said, 
“She regularly attended class.”  If that is the best thing I could say, 
you infer, I must be implying that she was a truly awful student.  In 
fact, you might think to yourself: “Solum is being cruel.  That is a 
horrible thing to say.”  But of course, I did not say anything horrible.  
What I said implied something horrible, given the context of our 
conversation.  Oh, here is another interesting bit: I might not even 
mean she attended class regularly—I might not even know whether 
she did or did not.  Because I did not say it to mean that—her 
attendance was not the point.  It is what I said, but not what I meant.  
Not at all. 
We can talk or we can text. 
How do we mean by texting?  Texting is a lot like talking.  We even 
call it “chat.”  Of course, legal texting is a bit different, not as 
immediate or interactive.  But there is an important subset of legal 
texting that involves durable and noninteractive text messages.  We 
can text legal norms—by opinion, by rule, or by statute.  Or we can 
text by constitution.  We can write it down now, and push send to 
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eternity.  Well, not really eternity, but a long time—centuries even.  
Not just to our friend, our colleague, our spouse, our significant other.  
But to a whole polity, for generations.  We can do constitutional 
texting. 
How do we mean by constitutional texting?  Constitutional texting 
is a lot like talking, but it is not talking.  It is texting.  And it is not 
just any sort of texting.  It is constitutional texting.  I cannot resist.  It 
is a constitution we are texting.  So, how do we mean by 
constitutional texting?  That is what this text—the one you are 
reading now—is all about.  That question and a few others.  Like 
these: How is constitutional texting like talking?  How is it different?  
How is constitutional texting like IMing or emailing?  How is 
constitutional texting like statutory texting?  How do we figure out 
what the Framers meant?  And how about the clauses—the text?  
What does the text mean and is that the same as what the Framers 
meant?  And not just “what do the clauses say?,” but also “what do 
they imply?”  Does the Constitution mean things it does not say?  
Does it say things it does not mean? 
We can talk or we can text. 
In this essay, I want to have a conversation—a textual exchange—
with Steve Smith‟s discussion of texting and meaning in Chapter Five 
of Law’s Quandary.2  Smith claims that the meaning of legal texts is 
“basically identical” with the semantic intentions of the author or 
authors.  That is the claim I want to engage.  We can say what we 
intend and we can intend what we say, but these connections are not 
necessary in the sense that Smith identifies.  My focus will be just a 
bit different than Smith‟s.  He is after global legal meaning, whereas I 
am focused on the meaning of constitutional texts. 
How is the rest of this text going to go?  By “this text” I meant this 
whole chunk of law review texting.  Here is the roadmap.  (I told you 
I would say that.)  Part II is called “Constitutional Texting” and it sets 
the stage—it situates this Article in contemporary constitutional 
theory.  Part III is “Smith,” and it is about Steve Smith and Law’s 
Quandary, as well as Paul Grice‟s theory of meaning.  Part IV is 
called “Framer‟s Meaning and Clause Meaning” and it develops a 
Gricean and anti-Smithian account of constitutional meaning.  Part V 
is “Conclusion: How to Do Things with Clauses,” and it wraps things 
up. 
 
 2. Id. at 101. 
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Enough roadmap.  Let‟s do things with words.3 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTING 
The Constitution is a text message.  The Framers texted us.  We got 
it.  We could hardly miss it.  There are millions of copies.  It is under 
glass in the National Archives.  It gets some play in high school civics 
and American history.  It is on the Web.  Some folks carry it 
around—in their vest pocket, so to speak—although that is not 
literally what I mean or maybe, not all I mean.  If you are reading 
this, you probably had to take “Constitutional Law.”  Or maybe you 
have to teach it.  Or you cannot teach it, but you write about it.  Or do 
it.  Practice it.  Interpret it.  Apply it. 
Of course, not many of us have actually read the whole text 
message.  It is really long.  It is complicated.  It is dry and boring.  On 
a cell phone, it would take thousands of screens to receive it.  Maybe 
only Akhil Amar
4
 has read the whole thing seriously.  I mean that for 
all I know (for sure) Akhil Amar may be the only person in the 
history of this Republic to have read the whole Constitution from 
beginning to end with the kind of seriousness that would produce full 
and deep comprehension.
5
  (Oh, there must be others.  You may be 
among them and possibly you are rather annoyed with my ignorance.)  
Amar sure seems to have read each and every word of the text 
message.  I have not.  Oh, sure.  I have read it.  More or less.  I have 
tried to read every word.  But come on.  Who can really read the 
Twelfth Amendment?
6
  Once you know that it made sure that there 
 
 3. See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina 
Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975). 
 4. Yale Law School Faculty, Akhil Reed Amar, http://www.law.yale.edu/ 
faculty/AAmar.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007). 
 5. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‟S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 
(2005). 
 6. You try reading it straight through for serious and deep comprehension: 
    . . . The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot 
for President and Vice President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an 
inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall name in their 
ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person 
voted for as Vice President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President and of all persons voted for as Vice President, and of 
the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and 
transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed 
to the President of the Senate; The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates, and the votes shall then be counted; the person having the 
greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such 
number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no 
person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the 
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will be no ties between the President and Vice President, why bother 
with the details?  Unless you have to, because maybe the presidential 
election really will end up in the Senate.
7
  Then you had better read it.  
Carefully.  Every jot and tittle.
8
 
The Framers texted us.  We got the message.  We have scanned it.  
Read it.  Limned it.  Glossed it.  Interpreted it.  Construed it.  Applied 
it.  Some parts are freaky.  “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances.”9  How cool is that?  “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.”10  Totally aretaic!  But what do those 
bits of constitutional texting mean? 
The Framers texted us.  What do we make of the fact that they 
 
House of Representatives shall choose immediately by ballot the President.  
But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the 
representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose 
shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the States, and a 
majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice.  And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of 
choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next 
following, then the Vice President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the President. 
    . . . The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President 
shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole 
number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from 
the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice 
President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole 
number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary 
to a choice.  But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of 
President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 7. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 153 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to count 
electoral votes.”); ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION 176 (2001); 
Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method, or How Charles 
Black Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional 
Timidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833, 848 (2004). 
 8. See Matthew 5:18 (King James) (“For assuredly, I say to you, till heaven 
and earth pass away, one jot or one tittle will by no means pass from the law till all is 
fulfilled.”); see also Wikipedia, Tittle, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tittle (last 
visited June 3, 2007) (“The phrase „jot and tittle‟ indicates that every small 
detail has received attention.”). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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texted us.  The Framers and ratifiers texted us, but are their purposes, 
expectations, or hopes relevant to what we do with their text?  They 
texted us, but is the plain meaning of the text somehow binding on 
us?  Does it require translation?
11
  They texted us.  Is it not up to us?  
After all, they are dead—as doornails.  We have to live with their text 
message.  Can we not choose what meaning to assign it?  Or get 
involved in high politics and choose the judges who choose the 
meaning?
12
  Or choose the judges who choose the unmeaning—after 
all, it is just a text message.  Could we, should we, would we?  Delete 
it.  Redact it.  Lose it. Or having lost it, find it again.  Restore a lost 
constitution?
13
 
Oh, and who is the us in “texted us” anyway?  Did they text 
everyone—popular texting?14  All three branches—departmentalism?  
Just the judiciary branch—judicial supremacy?  Just the Supreme 
Court—the dictatorship of nine? 
Part II is done.  Almost.  The text said it.  Almost.  Law review 
texting is special.  So there was the text and then there were the 
footnotes.  Lots of them.  Do not read them, they are boring, deadly.  
Unless
15
 they are by Balkin
16—that is a whole different story.17  But 
these footnotes—not by Balkin, that is for sure.  Hey!  You do not 
really even know if they are by me.  What is up with that?  The 
footnotes could have been added by zealous law review editors or my 
research assistant.  Same thing with opinions, even famous ones—
 
 11. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); 
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. 
REV. 125 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and 
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). 
 12. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinsion, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/ writings.htm#constitutionalrev.  By the way, if 
you are reading this footnote, I just want to say, read Balkin and Levinson‟s article.  
Really.  You will not regret it.  Actually, you might regret it.  After all, I do not even 
know who you are.  But you know what I mean.  Right? 
 13. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004). 
 14. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); see also Larry Alexander & Lawrence 
B. Solum, Popular?  Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005). 
 15. The asterisk or “star” footnote is an exception to this general rule.  See 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-Theorized Asterisk Footnote, 93 GEO. L.J.,1093 
(2005).  But this Article is an exception to the exception.  Compare supra note * 
(copyright notice and grant of open access license), with supra note ** (traditional 
asterisk footnote).  The ** footnote is the interesting one.  Well, actually, they are 
both interesting.  But in different ways. 
 16. Jack M. Balkin Home Page, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/ (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
 17. See J. M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275 (1989), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/foot1.htm. 
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who knows who writes them.  Oh yes, I almost forgot: same thing 
with the Constitution—the Constitution of the United States.  We do 
not know who wrote it in its final form; it happened in the committee 
of detail.  No records, not many reports about who did what.  And 
who said the Constitution anyway?  Who uttered the Constitution of 
the United States?  The Framer who drafted each bit of the text in its 
final form?  The Framers as a corporate body—the Constitutional 
Convention in Philadelphia?  The ratifiers—the bigger groups who 
met to say “yea” or “nay” in each of the states.  And what about, “We 
the People.”  Did they all say the Constitution?  Or do we utter the 
Constitution?  Are we saying it now?  Maybe no one uttered the 
Constitution.  Could that be right? 
It gets kind of complicated.  Anonymous texting.  Collective 
texting.  Retexting.  Like those text messages from T-Mobile or 
Verizon.  Who sends those anyway?  And if you do not know who 
sends them, how do you know what they mean?  Hey, I bet they are 
generated by some data system—which probably has bugs and 
generates messages never contemplated by the geeks who wrote the 
software.  Do those text messages mean anything at all? 
III.  SMITH 
In Law’s Quandary, Steve Smith addresses the question, “How 
does the law mean?”  The answer he gives has something in common 
with Paul Grice—a recognition of the foundational role of intention.  
Let me give a name to Smith‟s core position, which I shall call the 
“semantic intentions necessity thesis.”  Here is how Smith expresses 
this idea: “[T]he meaning of a legal text is necessarily given by—
indeed, is basically identical with—the semantic intentions of an 
author or authors of some sort.”18 
Smith‟s thesis requires considerable unpacking.  In particular, I 
want to focus on the following elements of the thesis: (1) Smith‟s use 
of the modal concept of necessity and his assertion that his claim of 
necessity is “ontological”; (2) Smith‟s notion of “meaning”; (3) 
Smith‟s use of the definite article the to qualify meaning; (4) Smith‟s 
use of “identity”; and (5) Smith‟s notion of semantic intentions. 
Let us begin with the term necessarily, the adverbial form of the 
noun necessity.  To belabor the obvious, necessity is not possibility.  
 
 18. SMITH, supra note 1, at 101. 
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Smith is not claiming that it is merely possible to identify “the 
meaning of a legal text” with “the semantic intentions of an author or 
authors.”  But what does he mean?  Modal claims are notoriously 
ambiguous.  One powerful technique for resolving their ambiguity is 
to translate the modal claim using possible worlds semantics.  The 
phrase, “possible world,” is from Leibniz and it has a technical 
meaning: a “possible world” is a possible state of the whole 
universe—of everything that is.19  If something is “necessarily true” 
in the broadest (or logical) sense, then it is true in all possible worlds.  
So when Smith makes a claim about ontological necessity, he seems 
to be making a claim about meaning that he asserts is true in all 
possible worlds, but he might be making a more limited claim—about 
only those possible worlds that are similar to the actual world in some 
specified way. 
After “necessity” there is “meaning,” and Smith tells us quite a bit 
about what he means by meaning.  Smith distinguished between 
semantic and nonsemantic meaning, and his claim is about semantic 
meaning, and not about nonsemantic significations of legal texts.
20
  
There is no good reason to quarrel with this distinction, but it may be 
helpful to add another distinction or three.  In his famous discussion 
of speech acts, Austin distinguishes between three different “acts” 
that can be associated with a single utterance.
21
  First, there is the 
locutionary act—the uttering of semantic content.22  So, as I am 
typing this sentence, I am using the roman alphabet (which has 
syntactic properties that conform to set a rules constituted by a 
complex social practice) and I am also saying something, which could 
be paraphrased in an indefinite number of ways or translated into 
German or Mandarin.  Second, there is the illocutionary act—the use 
of syntax and semantics to perform actions.
23
  “Illocutionary 
 
 19. See generally JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (2002) (providing a 
comprehensive introduction to possible worlds semantics and the metaphysics of 
modality); SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980) (discussing necessity); 
DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS (1986) (defending modal realism‟s 
view that our world is one of many, each with its own inhabitants); ALVIN 
PLANTINGA, ESSAYS IN THE METAPHYSICS OF MODALITY (Matthew Davidson ed. 
2003).  The idea of possible worlds was introduced by Leibniz.  See GOTTFRIED 
WILHELM FREIHERR VON LEIBNIZ, The Theodicy: Abridgement of the Argument 
Reduced to Syllogistic Form, in LEIBNIZ: SELECTIONS 509, 509-11 (Philip P. Weiner 
ed., Charles Scribner‟s Sons 1951).  Leibniz used the idea of a possible world in 
answer to the argument against the existence of good from the problem of evil.  See 
id. at 511.  The argument is not proven, Leibniz maintained, until it is shown that the 
actual world is not the best of all possible worlds.  See id. 
 20. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 103-05. 
 21. See AUSTIN, supra note 3, at 94-108. 
 22. See id. at 94. 
 23. See id. at 98-100. 
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uptake”—in Austin‟s felicitous phrasing24—is easy to identify in 
expressions like the following: “I [hereby] promise that this essay will 
be no more than 15,000 words” or “I [hereby] apologize for being 
late.”  The “hereby” in brackets may or may not be part of the actual 
utterance, but usually if it can be inserted it makes it explicit that the 
expression is performing some action.  Third, there is the 
perlocutionary act—the creation of a reaction through an 
expression.
25
  So, if I say, “Duncan Kennedy will be attending the 
conference,” you may be surprised, thrilled, annoyed, or frightened.  
Smith divides meaning into two kinds—semantic and nonsemantic.26  
By invoking Austin, I mean to suggest that this dichotomy is truly 
crude because it focuses exclusively on locutionary acts and 
perlocutionary effects, leaving syntax and speech acts entirely out of 
the picture. 
The next term we need to investigate is the.  Smith uses the definite 
article the to modify meaning when he expresses the semantics 
intentions necessity thesis.  This might be an accident, but my reading 
is that this was an intentional choice on Smith‟s part.  By using the 
definite article, he means to express an assumption.  We contrast the 
definite article the with the indefinite article a.  If Smith had said “a 
meaning of a legal text is necessarily given by—indeed, is basically 
identical with—the semantic intentions of an author or authors of 
some sort,” then he could have meant that among the possible 
meanings of a legal text is the meaning that is identical with the 
semantic intentions of the author or authors.  By using the definite 
article, he seems to be asserting something like the following: for 
each and every legal text, T, there is one and only one meaning, M, 
and M is identical with the semantic intentions, I, of some author or 
authors, A.  In other words, the semantics intentions necessity thesis 
incorporates the thesis that all legal texts have one and only one 
meaning.  Of course, Smith would not deny that texts can have 
multiple meanings in some sense.  For example, the same legal text 
can be interpreted in different ways by different courts.  So Smith 
must mean that each text has one and only one “true” or “correct” or 
“real” meaning. 
Next up is identity.  Smith asserts that the meaning of a legal text is 
 
 24. See id. at 117. 
 25. See id. at 101-02, 107-10, 118-20. 
 26. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 103-05. 
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“given by” or “identical to” the semantic intentions of an author.  I 
am not quite sure what Smith means by his identity claim.  Here is 
one possibility: legal texts do not have truth conditions in the same 
way that assertions have truth conditions.  But we might analogize to 
truth conditions and posit that legal texts have satisfaction conditions.  
Thus, a criminal prohibition on action X, is satisfied in circumstances 
Y, if no one X‟s in Y.  Smith might mean that the satisfaction 
conditions of any legal text T are identical to the satisfaction 
conditions of the author I (A,T), where I is a function that yields a 
semantic intention, I, from an author, A, who utters a text token T.  
Perhaps Smith has something else entirely in mind, but for purposes 
of discussion, I will assume that whatever he has in mind, it follows a 
similar pattern.  That is, the criteria for application of the legal text 
will map onto the criteria for success of the speaker‟s semantic 
intention in a way that preserves the relationship between criteria and 
facts about the world. 
Finally, we have Smith‟s notion of “semantic intention.”  Once 
again, I am not quite sure what Smith means.  Suppose that an author, 
A, utters a text, T, in circumstances C.  For Smith‟s project to get off 
the ground, it cannot be the case that A‟s semantic intention in 
uttering T is simply the purpose of the utterance.  The purpose may 
have been to produce a particular perlocutionary effect—to scare 
someone, for example.  But this perlocutionary effect is not the 
semantic meaning of T—that is obvious.  So semantic intentions must 
be something else?  But what else?  One possibility is that the 
semantic intention of a text, T, is itself a semantic entity—a sentence 
in the language of thought (mentalese) to borrow Jerry Fodor‟s 
provocative idea.  So the meaning of T is a sentence, S, in mentalese.  
It might be the case that S in mentalese is a direct translation from the 
natural language in which T is expressed, English, into mentalese.  
But this need not be the case.  So if I utter the sentence “I agree,” in 
English, it might be accompanied by the sentence “[I DO NOT 
AGREE]” in mentalese.  In which case, the meaning of “I agree” is 
“[I DO NOT AGREE].”  And one could truthfully say, “When he said 
„I agree‟ he meant „I do not agree.‟”  If Smith‟s notion is like this, 
then Smith‟s thesis might seem to entail that whatever we say, we 
always succeed in saying something which corresponds to what we 
meant.  There is no possible gap, because of the identity relationship 
between the text token T and the semantic intention token I.  Smith 
thinks (or might think) that we necessarily say what we mean. 
Lacking direct access to Smith‟s semantic intentions, I have done 
my best to lay out my reading of the semantic identity necessity 
thesis.  Of course, Smith may think that I have gotten him wrong.  
And he might be right.  But whether he is right or not will depend on 
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what my semantic intentions are—just as much as it depends on his 
semantic intentions.  And just as I have no direct access to Smith‟s 
semantic intentions, he lacks direct access to mine.  Of course, this 
issue is “merely epistemological.”  What we mean is one thing; 
whether we know what others mean is another.  In fact, it is not 
totally clear that either Smith or I has direct access to our own 
semantic intentions.  Semantic intentions do not need to be occurrent 
thoughts—one can speak without a sentence in mentalese being 
present to consciousness.  And this creates the possibility that we do 
not always know what we mean, even though what we mean is our 
own semantic intention.  That is, when we author some text, A, it is 
possible that the accompanying I is inaccessible to conscious 
inspection—our meanings might be unconscious. 
Before we go any further, we need to get a red herring out of the 
way.  Smith‟s discussion of this side issue focuses on an argument 
made by Gary Lawson, who argued that the Constitution should be 
read like a recipe and that recipes should be read in light of their 
original public meaning, as opposed to the private intentions of the 
cook (or correspondingly, the Framers).
27
  Smith responds: 
Lawson‟s proposition seems positively perverse.  After all, if we are reading 
the recipe in an effort to cook fried chicken and on the assumption that the 
recipe was written by someone who was a specialist in the art, then what we 
care about in reading the recipe is what the cook intended.  Conversely, we 
care not at all about the recipe‟s original public meaning—except perhaps as 
an aid to figuring out what the cook actually meant.28 
There are many things that could be said about this passage, but one 
thing is absolutely crucial.  This is not an argument in favor of the 
semantic intentions necessity thesis.  Take a particular recipe—say 
the recipe for Mom‟s apple pie.  As applied to that recipe, the 
semantic intentions necessity thesis is that in all possible worlds (or 
all worlds in which Mom‟s recipe exists), there is one and only one 
meaning of the recipe for Mom‟s apple pie, and that meaning 
corresponds to the semantic intention of the author in that world.  If 
semantic intentions were sentences in mentalese, then the meaning of 
a Mom‟s recipe just is the equivalent recipe in Mom‟s mentalese.  If 
this were the case, then it would be silly to talk about how recipes 
“should be read” or “what we care about.”  These are normative 
 
 27. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 
1823 (1997). 
 28. SMITH, supra note 1, at 106. 
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arguments for preferring one meaning to another, but if the semantic 
intentions necessity thesis were true, then the very idea of preferring 
one meaning to another meaning is nonsense. 
Because Smith‟s argument is framed in terms of choice between 
one meaning and another, his normative argument against Lawson 
presupposes that the semantic intentions necessity thesis is false.  At 
this point, the principle of charity in interpretation requires us to 
interpret Smith‟s argument in a way that avoids contradiction.  So, let 
us assume that Smith means to say, “If it were possible to choose 
between public recipe meaning and cook‟s intentions recipe meaning, 
then we should prefer the latter over the former.”  Even fixed in this 
way, there is some tension between Smith‟s argument and the 
semantic intentions necessity thesis: that is because Smith‟s argument 
seems so reasonable and commonsensical that we are naturally led to 
accept that the choice it assumes is a real one.  So even though 
Smith‟s argument in response to Larson does not commit Smith to a 
logical contradiction, it does seem to create a tension. 
The recipe example is a good one because it provides a marvelous 
context in which to test the semantic intentions necessity thesis.  But 
in order to get at the test, we need to elaborate the example just a bit.  
Consider the following hypothetical situation.  Let‟s call it 
“Anonymous Recipe Bank”: 
Anonymous Recipe Bank.  Imagine that someone sets up an anonymous recipe 
bank.  Let‟s suppose it is on the Internet.  Contributors submit their recipe 
via a Web page and the recipe is then indexed and classified.  Let‟s suppose 
that Mom submits her recipe for apple pie, which appears in the recipe bank 
as follows: 
INGREDIENTS: 
1 recipe pastry for a 9-inch double crust pie 
3/4 cup white sugar 
2 tablespoons all-purpose flour 
1/8 teaspoon salt 
1 teaspoon ground cinnamon 
1/4 teaspoon ground nutmeg 
6 tart apples—peeled, cored, and sliced 
2 tablespoons butter 
2 tablespoons whiskey 
DIRECTIONS: 
Preheat oven to 450 degrees F (225 degrees C).  Fit bottom 
crust into a 9-inch pie plate. 
In a small bowl, mix together sugar, flour, salt, cinnamon, 
and nutmeg.  Place sliced apples in a large bowl and sprinkle 
with sugar mixture.  Toss until apples are thoroughly coated.  
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Spoon apples into pan. 
Dot apples with butter or margarine, then sprinkle with 
whiskey.  Cover with top crust.  Seal edges and cut steam vents 
in top. 
Bake in preheated oven for ten minutes.  Lower temperature 
to 350 degrees F (175 degrees C) and bake an additional forty 
minutes.  Serve warm. 
The author of the text is Mom; she uploaded the recipe.  But because 
this is an anonymous recipe bank, we do not know who Mom is.  So 
we have no way of acquiring particular knowledge of her semantic 
intentions.  But we do know this: Mom knew that her recipe would be 
anonymous.  So we know that Mom knew that we would not know 
anything about her particular intentions.  Mom would know that we 
would have to fall back on the ordinary or standard meaning of the 
various elements that make up recipe.  Mom knows that we could not 
know that by “butter,” she means margarine.  Mom knows that we 
could not know that by “whiskey,” she means rum.  So Mom knows 
that her recipe will be given its “public meaning” or what Grice might 
call its “sentence meaning.”29  So we will interpret Mom‟s recipe by 
assigning the ordinary meanings to each of the ingredients and 
measures.  To coin a phrase, we will interpret Mom‟s recipe for apple 
pie by using the idea of “recipe meaning” and not the idea of “cook‟s 
meaning.” 
And this is where it gets really interesting.  Because it is precisely 
at this juncture that Smith can make an intuitive and apparently 
persuasive move—a wonderful move.  Smith can say, “Yes, and this 
example proves my point.”  In this situation, we are interpreting 
Mom‟s intentions.  Given the situation, our interpretation is that Mom 
intended the words to have their ordinary public meaning.  In other 
words, we say that the meaning of the recipe is its “recipe meaning” 
because “recipe meaning” is “cook‟s meaning.”  So Smith can argue 
that Anonymous Recipe Bank confirms the semantic intentions 
necessity thesis. 
Or does it?  Consider a variation, which we can call Anonymous 
Recipe Bank with Mistake. 
Anonymous Recipe Bank with Mistake.  Mom submits her recipe as before.  
But now Mom has made a mistake.  Mom has the mistaken belief that the 
name of rum is “whiskey.”  Mom‟s not much of a drinker, she got confused 
 
 29. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 117-37 (1989). 
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when she was a small child, and no one has ever corrected her mistake—
although every so often Mom is puzzled by smirks and giggles provoked by 
her remarking that the “whiskey” in “whiskey sours” does not taste like 
“whiskey” at all.  Of course, the recipe bank is anonymous, so when 
someone makes Mom‟s apple pie, they make it with whiskey and not rum. 
Does this variation pose any difficulties for Smith?  He has an 
obvious move.  He can simply say, “The recipe calls for rum, not 
whiskey.  Rum was Mom‟s semantic intention.  Of course, it may be 
the case that no one (other than Mom) knows that the recipe calls for 
rum, but that is just an epistemological problem.” 
Now suppose that Mom learns of her mistake.  Someone fills her in 
on the difference between rum and whiskey.  “Oh dear,” Mom says to 
herself, “what does the recipe taste like with whiskey?”  And then 
Mom tries the recipe—and she decides that the pie actually is very 
good with whiskey rather than rum.  And she now says, “The recipe 
that I submitted is not the one that I intended, but it is actually a very 
good recipe.”  I think it is beyond question that Mom might say 
something much like this.  That is, she might say that that the recipe 
that she wrote is not the recipe that she intended to write.  If we asked 
her whether someone who used whiskey rather than rum was making 
a mistake about the meaning of her recipe, she might say, “No, I 
made the mistake.  They just followed the recipe.”  In other words, 
Mom might deny the meaning of her recipe is identical with her 
semantic intentions—and thus, she might deny the semantic 
intentions necessity thesis. 
But Smith does not need to concede that Mom is right about this.  
Smith is entitled to say that Mom is simply mistaken about who is 
mistaken.  Smith could insist that Mom‟s recipe really was for apple 
pie with rum and not for apple pie made with whiskey.  Of course, 
Smith needs to acknowledge that Mom‟s way of putting things is 
consistent with the way that we ordinarily talk about meaning.  But 
Smith can say that our ordinary talk is imprecise.  Ordinary talk refers 
to “pseudo-meanings,” Smith might say.  Pseudo-meanings may be 
mistaken for real meanings because of epistemic mistakes.  But 
precisely because it takes a mistake to produce a pseudo-meaning, we 
can see that they are not real. 
Smith‟s move to pseudo-meanings can be illuminated by yet 
another variation, which we can call Anonymous Recipe Contest.  
Here is how it goes: 
Anonymous Recipe Contest.  The anonymous recipe bank now holds a 
contest for the best apple pie recipe.  As before, Mom submits her recipe.  
As in the case of Anonymous Recipe Bank with Mistake, Mom writes 
“whiskey” but means “rum.”  But the rules for the contest were written by 
Gary Lawson, and they state explicitly: “The meaning of your recipe will be 
determined by the ordinary public meaning of the ingredients and 
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procedures that you include.  The judges of the contest will not consider any 
private meanings, no matter how much they improve the recipe.” 
Once again, Mom learns of her mistake.  Let us suppose that Mom 
has been talking with Smith.  She emails the organizers of the contest 
and instructs them to use rum rather than whiskey when they test her 
recipe.  Their email in reply states that the she knew the rules and the 
rules specified “ordinary public meanings.”  Mom replies that this 
“cannot be a rule.  Because of the semantic intentions necessity thesis, 
it is impossible for the recipe to mean anything other than my 
semantic intentions.”  Mom demands that they follow her recipe, or 
call off the contest because of the ontological impossibility of the 
contest rules. 
Are Mom and Smith right?  Is recipe meaning impossible?  Is 
cook‟s meaning necessarily the only meaning?  This brings us to 
Smith‟s “ontological argument.”  As Smith puts it, “under the 
ontological conceptions that most of us entertain, and in a world in 
which most of us have discarded „animistic‟ notions, persons have the 
property or capability of being able to mean.”30  Smith illustrates his 
thesis with the following case, adapted from Paul Campos, which we 
shall call Written in the Sand by the Wind: 
[W]hile walking in the desert near the border between the United States and 
Mexico, you come across marks in the sand forming the figures “R E A L,” 
and you wonder what these marks mean.  Your first step will be to guess 
whether the marks were made by an English-speaking or Spanish-speaking 
agent.  If you think the marks were made by an English speaker, you 
probably will interpret them to mean something like “real” in the sense of 
“actual” or “existing.”  If you suppose instead that the marks were made by 
someone speaking Spanish, then you will understand them to mean 
something like the English term “royal.”  But if you think the marks were 
made by no one, and were instead simply the fortuitous effect of wind on the 
desert sand, then you will not suppose the marks actually mean anything at 
all: they are merely a strange accident devoid of meaning.  The most you 
might do (and this will turn out to be a tremendously important possibility) 
is to imagine that if the marks had been made by an English speaker, they 
would mean . . . , and so forth.  But even here, it is an author (albeit a 
hypothetical one), not the marks in themselves or as free-floating entities, 
that supplies meaning.31 
Of course, there is something quite odd going on here, because Smith 
himself seems to use expressions that are inconsistent with his own 
thesis.  Consider: 
 
 30. SMITH, supra note 1, at 108. 
 31. Id. at 108-09 (footnote omitted, ellipsis in original). 
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 “you wonder what these marks mean” 
 “you will probably interpret them to mean” 
 “you will understand them to mean.” 
In each case, Smith refers to the meaning of the marks and not the 
meaning of the author of the marks.  That is, Smith‟s way of talking 
seems to assume that marks have meanings and to deny that meaning 
is identical to the semantic intentions of the author.  Smith recognizes 
this difficulty.  Here is what he says about it: 
It is surely true that objects (such as marks on a page) can be used by 
persons to convey meanings; and so in a shorthand expression we may refer 
to the “meaning” of an object (in the same way that we may say, as a 
shorthand expression, that the “purpose” of a bus is to transport people, or 
that the “purpose” of a hammer is to pound nails).  Taken too literally or 
simple-mindedly, such statements might seem to lapse into primitive 
animism—as in the assertion that “rocks fall because they crave the earth.”  
But in fact we readily understand such statements to be shorthand 
expressions of more complex propositions, such as “People make and use 
hammers to pound nails.”32 
If we interpolate Smith‟s shorthand expression notion into his own 
remarks in Written in the Sand by the Wind, then we see that Smith 
would expand each of the statements quoted above as follows: 
 “you wonder what these marks mean” becomes “you will 
wonder what the author of these marks meant by them” 
 “you will probably interpret them to mean” becomes “you 
will probably interpret the author to have meant” 
 “you will understand them to mean” becomes “you will 
understand the author to have meant” 
But now something seems to have gone wrong.  The expanded 
expressions clearly mean something that is different than the meaning 
of the so-called shorthand originals.  For example, the expression “the 
purpose of a hammer is to pound nails” simply is not equivalent to the 
expression “people make and use hammers to pound nails.”  
Hammers do have a function that is a function of hammers qua 
hammers, and that function is to pound things.  The function is a 
product of human design and the function enables the use, but the 
design and use are not equivalent to the function.  So this example not 
only fails to support Smith‟s shorthand expression notion, it actually 
undermines it.  This same problem infects the attempt to analyze the 
expressions from Written in the Sand by the Wind as shorthand 
expressions.
33
  That the meaning of these expressions would be a 
 
 32. Id. at 109-10. 
 33. In comments on a draft of Smith‟s paper, I wrote: 
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product of their inscription by an author does not entail that the 
meaning of the expressions is identical to the semantic intentions of 
the author.  Indeed, the fact that the meaning is a product of the 
author‟s semantic intentions shows that the meaning is not identical to 
them.  If X is the product of Y, then X is not identical to Y. 
Let me state my own point more directly.  It is an obvious fact 
about the grammar
34
 of “meaning” that language, symbols, texts, 
speeches, sayings, and other expressions have meanings.  That is why 
Smith himself talks about the meaning of expressions rather than the 
meanings intended by the author.  He is simply going with the flow—
conforming to, rather than resisting, the grammar of our concept of 
meaning.  And that grammar is consistent with most of what Smith 
says about the relationship between meaning and authors.  There is no 
contradiction (or even tension) between the claim that texts mean and 
the claim that the meaning of texts is produced by authors.  It could 
even be consistent with Smith‟s much stronger and ambitious claim—
 
   When I say to a student this sentence in your paper means something 
quite different than you intended, this is not shorthand for, “You meant 
something quite different by using this sentence than you intended to mean 
by using this sentence.”  Those are two different sentences with two 
different meanings.  If [Smith were] correct, the first sentence would 
reduce to the second and then it seems incoherent.  But the first sentence is 
coherent and does not reduce to the second. 
   The difference in meaning is highlighted by noticing that there is a 
syntactical difference between the transitive and intransitive forms of the 
verb “to mean.”  Consider the following examples: 
• Sentence tokens of the type “X means Y,” such as “The 
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution means that 
Congress must aim to promote the progress of science when it 
modifies copyright terms.” 
• Sentence tokens of the type “P means Y by X,” such as “The 
Framers meant that the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution means that Congress must aim to promote the 
progress of science when it modifies copyright terms.” 
   The syntactic difference between the two sentence types suggests a 
difference in meaning.  Moreover, sentences of the first type are not 
reducible to sentences of the second type—for the obvious reason that the 
second type includes content omitted in the first type.  The fact that our 
ordinary language has two different forms (transitive and intransitive) of 
the verb “to mean” and that these forms have different semantic content 
suggests that sentence of the type “X means Y” are not equivalent to 
sentences of the type “P means Y by X.”  If they are not equivalent, then I 
would think that we would ordinarily conclude that sentence tokens of the 
first type would not be mere shorthand for sentence tokens of the second 
type. 
 34. I mean “grammar” in the Wittgensteinian sense. 
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that this connection is a matter of ontological necessity. 
Let me begin by returning to Written in the Sand by the Wind.  
Consider the following dialog, which comes from comments I made 
on a draft of this part of Law’s Quandary: 
Does the example get rhetorical force from the ambiguity between Spanish 
and English?  Suppose for example, you came across the following: 
υομοσ 
Now, there is no ambiguity between English and Spanish, but the letters 
still might have gotten their shape from the random action of the wind. 
“Look,” I say, “Nomos, that means norm or law in Greek.” 
You say, “We do not know who or what inscribed those letters in the 
sand.  It may mean something entirely different or it may mean 
nothing at all.” 
I say, “Well, it might also mean something different, but that is a 
token of the word type Nomos in ancient Greek.  It means what it 
means, however it came to be.” 
You say, “No, you are now becoming the author of that meaning.” 
I reply, “Not me.  I did not write it in the sand, and anyone else who 
knows ancient Greek would recognize the meaning.” 
“But you are implicitly attributing an author to those marks,” you say. 
“No I am not,” I reply.  “No such thought ran through my mind.” 
“Well maybe it was a subconscious thought,” you reply. 
“Maybe,” I retort, “but you have no evidence for that hypothesis.” 
“But what if no one ever came here,” you say, “would it mean 
anything then?” 
“Sure,” I say, “it would still mean what it means.  Trees that fall in the 
forest when no one is listening still make an awful lot of noise.” 
“But without an author,” you say, “those would be just a meaningless 
set of marks in the sand.” 
“Try telling that to someone who can read ancient Greek.  There is a 
difference between „It is all Greek to me,‟ and „It is a meaningless set 
of marks,‟” I say. 
“But what if it was just the wind?” you say.  “Surely it has no meaning 
then.” 
“Surely, it does,” I say, “It is a well formed expression in ancient 
Greek.  Its well-formedness is a property of the marks, and not of the 
agent that caused the marks to come into being.  If the expression is 
well formed, it has meaning.” 
“Not true meaning,” you say. 
“Not intended meaning,” I reply. 
“But it is an ontological fact about meaning that true meaning is 
intended meaning,” you say. 
“No, it is simply a fact of the matter,” I say.  “As a matter of fact, 
meanings are usually intentional, but nothing guarantees that this must 
be so.  And sometimes it is not so.” 
“You are missing the point,” you reply.  “The connection between 
semantic meaning and persons is ontological precisely because it is a 
necessary property of semantic meaning that it is created by persons.” 
“But how do you know that?” I ask. 
Is there an ontological and necessary connection between meaning 
and the semantic intentions of persons?  Smith recognizes that this 
claim is problematic: 
Am I proposing [the semantic intentions necessity thesis] as a truth that will 
obtain in, as philosophers say, all “possible worlds”?  Offered in these 
extreme forms, the claim connecting meaning with persons would be 
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implausible, I think, because if we want to fantasize, we can imagine, for 
example, impersonal or inanimate entities somehow forming themselves into 
what look like words and sentences that in fact turn out to convey accurate 
information.35 
Smith then presents three examples that originate in my comments on 
a prior draft of this discussion.  Let me present the examples in their 
original form.  Let us call this Delphic Desert Wind: 
   When you go out to the desert near the Mexican border and wait around 
for a while at a certain spot, well-formed expressions appear.  Here are three 
examples: 
 
 On January 3, 2002, the following letters appeared in the sand, 
“Tomorrow, there will be an unusual hail storm in the Kearny 
Mesa area.  Park your car in the garage.”  The reader parks his 
car in the garage that night, and avoids the damage inflicted on 
his neighbor‟s cars. 
 On April 7, 2001, the following letters appeared in the sand, 
“Buy stock in Amalgamated Widgets and hang onto it for a year.  
Then sell.”  The reader does not follow the advice, but the stock 
triples during the one-year period, and then falls back to its 
original value within a few weeks. 
 On October 8, 2002, the following letters appear in the sand: 
“There is a really good deal on Charmin at Costco.”  The reader 
goes to Costco, and buys one of those enormous containers of 
Charmin at half the usual price. 
Is there any explanation for this phenomenon that does not include semantic 
meaning for the marks in the sand?  A reader reads the marks, and the marks 
communicate to the reader.  The reader is not the author of the marks or of 
their meaning.  The meaning comes into the world independently of the 
reader.  The marks successfully convey meaning to the reader. 
In response to Delphic Desert Wind, Smith now writes: 
I think Solum is right: we can imagine such a world—in fact, we just did—
and that possibility suggests that the claim connecting meaning with persons 
is not an assertion of logical necessity or an a priori claim applicable to all 
possible worlds. . . .  But Solum goes on to observe of his hypothetical 
communications by inanimate objects that “[i]n the actual world, this will 
never happen”; and that of course is the point.  In our world, or within the 
ontological inventories that most of us employ, persons have the capacity to 
form and convey semantic meanings.  Impersonal objects (such as rocks and 
rivers and teapots—and marks on a page) do not have this capacity; at most 
they can serve to convey persons’ meanings.36 
It is very important that we get clear about what Smith is saying here.  
 
 35. Id. at 111. 
 36. Id. 
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Recall Smith‟s thesis: “[T]he meaning of a legal text is necessarily 
given by—indeed, is basically identical with—the semantic intentions 
of an author or authors of some sort.”37  Smith has now clarified.  His 
claim can still be interpreted as a modal claim about necessity of a 
particular sort—which we can call nomological and historical 
necessity.  In all possible worlds that share the history of the actual 
world and its physical laws, each and every well-formed expression 
with semantic meaning is brought into being through the agency of 
some person. 
Given this understanding, we can make two observations about 
Smith‟s argument.  First, it does not support the semantic intentions 
necessity thesis.  The argument does not establish that the meaning of 
texts is identical to author‟s intentions; rather, it establishes that 
intentional actions by authors are the necessary causes of texts—
given the history and physical laws of the actual world.  But causation 
and identity are two different relationships.  Establishing that X is a 
necessary cause of Y is not the same as establishing that X and Y are 
identical. 
Second, Smith‟s causal claim—that things like “rocks and rivers 
and teapots—and marks on a page” lack the capacity to form and 
convey meaning is ambiguous and potentially misleading.
38
  Notice 
that there are two separate claims—one about the capacity to “form 
meaning” and the other about the capacity to “convey meaning.”  Let 
us deal with meaning formation first and then consider conveying. 
Smith does not tell us what he means by “form meaning,” but it 
seems reasonable to assume that formation is a causal process.  Rivers 
lack the capacity to form meaning because they operate according to 
causal laws that do not permit them to create syntactically well-
formed expressions.  Well, that is not quite true.  One can imagine a 
river or the wind writing a well-formed sentence.  It is not really 
impossible.  It is just very unlikely.  The best that we expect that 
rivers could do would be to inscribe a very rough approximation of a 
very short word. 
Notice, however, that the formation claim as applied to “marks on a 
page” is very odd.  On one level, this claim seems trivial.  Marks on a 
page can be well-formed expressions, but they cannot themselves 
form new well-formed expressions.  How can a sentence write a 
sentence?  Of course, the individual marks can form a well-formed 
expression; in that sense, it is perfectly obvious that Smith‟s claim 
would be incorrect.  Moreover, there is a special category of marks on 
 
 37. Id. at 101. 
 38. Id. at 111. 
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a page—expressions in a programming language—that actually can 
cause well-formed expressions to come into being.  These days we 
have all had the experience of interacting with nonpersons—computer 
programs—that can form well-formed expressions that communicate 
semantic meaning to us.  For example, you can interact with a 
program that will tell you when your flight is departing.  Of course, 
humans wrote the program (or in some cases, wrote the program that 
wrote the program).  But all this does is establish that the agency of 
some person is a necessary part of the causal chain—not that meaning 
is identical to the semantic intentions of some person.  Indeed, the 
case of computer programs that produce well-formed expressions 
with semantic meaning actually disproves the claim that meaning is 
necessarily identical to the semantic intentions of some author or 
authors.  Computer programs can be very complex indeed, and many 
actually existing programs can create sentences that the author of the 
program did not and could not have anticipated.  One reason for this 
is that computers can execute routines that are beyond the capacity of 
any human.  Of course, computer-generated meanings are dependent 
on human causes, but dependence does not entail identity. 
We can now turn to Smith‟s second claim, that things like “rocks 
and rivers and teapots—and marks on a page” lack the capacity to 
convey meaning.  Well, that claim is clearly false.  Rocks, rivers, and 
teapots may lack the capacity to convey meaning, but marks on a page 
surely do have that capacity.  In fact, Smith himself says that marks 
on a page can convey meaning.
39
  So, I think we need to assume that 
Smith did not mean what he said.  That is, the only way to make 
sense of Smith is to assume that the meaning of what he wrote is 
different than the meaning which he intended the text to convey.  That 
is, to make sense of Smith, we must assume that the semantic 
intentions necessity thesis is false.  The meaning of what Smith said 
is not identical with Smith‟s semantic intentions. 
How can this be?  What can explain the gap between what we say 
and what we intend to say?  Smith argues, persuasively, that the gap 
cannot be explained by dictionary meaning.
40
  Dictionaries merely 
report patterns of usage; they do not legislate meaning.  And the 
meaning of well-formed expressions are not a simple concatenation of 
the meanings of individual words—language does not work like that.  
 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 114. 
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But Smith is wrong, I think, to claim that “[t]he same point applies to 
linguistic conventions.”41  He writes: 
What sense would it make, after all, to say, “Although speakers in this 
culture intend this phrase to mean X, and although listeners understand 
speakers who use the phrase to mean X, nonetheless according to the 
„conventions of the language‟ the sentence actually means Y.”  If persons 
understand that speakers use the phrase to have a particular meaning, then it 
is nonsensical to suppose that there could be conventions that “really” give it 
a different meaning.42 
But this example simply does not do the work that Smith needs it to 
do.  If the speaker intends X and the audience understands X, the 
reason is that there is a linguistic convention that the utterance means 
X in the circumstances in which it is uttered. 
The crucial case for Smith is one in which an author or speaker 
utters expression E and under the linguistic convention that applies in 
the circumstances, E means Y.  The audience understands E to mean 
Y.  The speaker, however, intends to mean X.  For example: 
Ben says, “That song is really cool.” 
Alice says, “Yeah, I love it.” 
Ben says, “But it is cool.  How can you love it?” 
Alice says, “I love it, because it is so cool.” 
Ben says, “But when I said it was cool, I meant it was awful.” 
Alice says, “That may be what you meant to say, but it was not what you 
said.  Do you live under a rock?  „Cool‟ means cool, hip, happening, with 
it.” 
Ben says, “No, cool means bad.” 
Alice says, “Now you get it.  That song was bad.  It was phat.” 
Alice tells Ben that his communication misfired—he said 
something he did not mean.  Of course, that case is quite different 
from one in which Ben and Alice share a special, nonstandard 
convention, as in the following example: 
Ben says, “When I say cool, I mean awful.” 
Alice says, “Okay, cool means awful.” 
Ben says, “That song is really cool.” 
Alice says, “I do not agree.  It is an awesome song.” 
Ben says, “But it is cool.  How can you love it?” 
Alice says, “It is not cool in that funny way you mean cool.  I love it because 
its cool-cool.  Really cool.” 
We can all agree that in this second example, Ben‟s communication 
has not misfired.  The important point is that there is a difference 
between the two cases.  In case one, the meaning of what Ben says 
departs from his semantic intentions.  In case two, the meaning of 
what Ben says is identical to his semantic intentions.  If Smith‟s 
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analysis were correct, then this difference could not obtain.  But it 
does obtain, and hence Smith‟s equation of meaning with the 
semantic intentions of the author cannot be correct. 
One way to get at this issue is via Paul Grice‟s distinction between 
speaker‟s meaning and sentence meaning.43  Grice‟s idea of speaker‟s 
meaning is actually quite familiar.  We get at the idea of speaker‟s 
meaning all the time in ordinary conversations: “What did he mean by 
that?”  In the context of legal texts, we ask questions like: “What did 
the legislature mean by the provision?”  “What did the judge mean by 
that sentence in the opinion?”  “What did the Framers mean by that 
clause in the Constitution?” 
Grice contended that speaker‟s meaning, in turn, can be analyzed in 
terms of a speaker‟s (or author‟s) intentions.  His point is illustrated 
by the following thought experiment: 
[I]magine that you have stopped at night at an intersection.  The driver of 
another car flashes her lights at you, and you make the inference the reason 
for her doing this is that she wants to cause you to believe that your lights 
are not on.  And based on this inference, you now do, in fact, realize that 
your lights are not on. 
In this example, the meaning of the flashing lights is the product of 
the following complex intention—as explicated by Richard Grandy 
and Richard Warner: 
The driver flashes her lights intending: 
(1) that you believe that your lights are not on; 
(2) that you recognize her intention (1); 
(3) that this recognition be part of your reason for believing that 
your lights are not on.
44
 
In the case of imperatives, the intention is that the audience (or 
reader) perform a certain act on the basis of the reader‟s recognition 
 
 43. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, 
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of the author‟s intention that the reader perform the act. 
What about sentence meaning?  In its simplest (and perhaps 
simplified) form, the idea is that words and expressions have standard 
meanings—the meanings that are conventional given relevant 
linguistic practices.  As Hurd puts it, “In other words, the sentence 
meaning of a particular utterance can be understood not by reference 
to the illocutionary intentions of the speaker, but rather by reference 
to the illocutionary intentions that speakers in general have when 
employing such an utterance.”45  Hurd goes on to criticize this 
solution, but I want to put this sort of controversy to the side at this 
point. 
What does Smith have to say about the Gricean distinction between 
speaker‟s meaning and sentence meaning?  He makes three points: 
First, philosophers‟ references to “sentence meaning” or lawyers‟ talk of 
“objective meanings” should not be taken to show that words can have a 
context-free meaning independent of any author‟s semantic intentions. 
. . . . 
Second, even for the limited purpose of distinguishing normal from 
idiosyncratic or deviant language uses, we should be wary of distinctions 
between “speaker‟s meaning” and “sentence meaning” or “conventional 
meaning.” 
. . . . 
Finally, the limited purposes that may be validly served by distinctions 
between speaker‟s and sentence meanings, or between “intended” and 
“objective” meanings, have scant relevance in any case to the interpretation 
of legal enactments.46 
Each of these points requires some discussion.  Let us take them in 
order. 
Smith‟s first point should now be familiar.  This is another version 
of the claim that sentence meaning is not independent of authors‟ 
intentions.  That is right.  But my reply is also familiar: dependence 
does not imply equivalence.  Thus, the Gricean story about sentence 
meaning incorporates intentions in a complex way.  Sentence 
meaning is dependent on the way language is typically used.  Typical 
use consists of many exemplars of speaker‟s meaning—of the 
meaning that particular speakers intend in particular contexts.  So, 
sentence meaning depends on speaker‟s meaning and speaker‟s 
meaning depends on the intentions of particular speakers.  But there is 
no “typical speaker” whose intentions determine “speaker‟s 
meaning.”  Of course, we can speak as if there were a typical speaker.  
That is, we can use the typical speaker as a heuristic.  But the typical 
speaker is not an actual person.  And because the typical speaker is 
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not an actual person, the typical speaker does not have actual 
intentions.  And because there are no such actual intentions, it cannot 
be the case that sentence meaning is identical to them. 
Recall that Smith‟s second point was that “even for the limited 
purpose of distinguishing normal from idiosyncratic or deviant 
language uses, we should be wary of distinctions between „speaker‟s 
meaning‟ and „sentence meaning‟ or „conventional meaning.‟”47  
Most of Smith‟s discussion of this second point does not really 
engage Grice‟s distinction.  We need the distinction between 
speaker‟s meaning and sentence meaning to make sense of certain 
kinds of communication.  For speaker‟s meaning to get off the 
ground, the author must know that the reader is aware of the speaker‟s 
intentions.  This reflexive relationship may not be required for the 
text to “mean” in Smith‟s sense, but it is certainly required for the text 
to “communicate” or “convey” speaker‟s meaning.  In the case of 
legal texts, the conditions for speaker‟s meaning frequently do not 
obtain.  That is, the readers—citizens, lawyers, judges—frequently do 
not possess sufficient information about the intentions of the 
lawmakers—judges, legislators, Framers—for speaker‟s meaning to 
be conveyed. 
Smith‟s third and final point was that “the limited purposes that 
may be validly served by distinctions between speaker‟s and sentence 
meanings, or between „intended‟ and „objective‟ meanings, have 
scant relevance . . . to the interpretation of legal enactments.”48  This 
point is based on the same confusion that characterized the second 
point—it assumes that sentence meaning is some sort of corrective for 
deviant meanings, but that is not even remotely close to Grice‟s point.  
Smith writes: 
Parties to private contracts may sometimes use language in tricky or deviant 
ways that courts need to guard against by focusing on what they may choose 
(at their and our peril) to call “objective” meanings . . . .  But the drafters 
and enactors of statutes and constitutional provisions do not tend to be 
highly idiosyncratic in their use of language after the manner of, say, 
humorists or poets.  On the contrary, legislative drafters incline to 
dullness—to a numbing standardization—in their expressions.49 
Smith‟s description of the phenomena is right on target, but he has the 
lesson backwards.  What Smith calls “numbing standardization” is, in 
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fact, a result of the communicative situation that Framers and 
legislators face.  When the author knows that the reader will not know 
very much about the author‟s intentions, then you had better go with 
sentence meanings if you want to communicate.  That is, you had 
better go with the meanings that can be attributed by readers who 
have only the scantiest information about your semantic intentions.  
Moreover, there are sound normative reasons to use sentence meaning 
rather than speaker‟s meaning when we interpret constitutions (or 
legislation).  Constitutions are intended for a wide audience across 
generational and geographic lines.  We have very good reason to 
adopt the interpretive conventions that will create shared public 
meanings for the Constitution; we have good reasons to eschew 
reliance on arcane or private knowledge about the semantic intentions 
of the drafters when that knowledge was not publicly available when 
the Constitution was ratified. 
Recall that Smith talks about “the meaning of a legal text,” and 
thereby makes an implicit claim that a text can have only one true or 
correct meaning.  Smith has no good argument for that claim, and it 
seems rather unlikely that he could possibly produce one because it is 
perfectly obvious that texts can have multiple meanings—speaker‟s 
meaning, sentence meaning, and reader‟s meanings.  On close 
inspection, we found that Smith had no real argument for the 
semantic intentions necessity thesis.  His normative arguments 
actually undermined rather than supported the thesis.  On close 
inspection, we found that his claim about the necessary identity of 
meanings and semantic intentions was, in actuality, a claim that 
persons are causally necessary to the production of well-formed 
expressions.  Even that modest claim turns out to be false, but the 
more important point is that Smith has no argument against the 
possibility of sentence meanings that are not identical with or 
reducible to speaker‟s meanings.  That point opens the door for our 
return to constitutional texting. 
IV.  FRAMER‟S MEANING AND CLAUSE MEANING 
There is an obvious parallelism between Grice‟s discussion of 
speaker‟s meaning and sentence meaning and contemporary debates 
in constitutional theory.  In that debate, a distinction is drawn between 
two forms of originalism—“original meaning originalism” and 
“original intentions originalism.”  Both forms of originalism are 
sometimes contrasted with textualism.  In this Part of the essay, I 
shall explore this parallelism. 
Let us begin with the idea that the Constitution should be 
interpreted to have the meaning that was originally intended by the 
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Framers.  I will not bother to recite the many withering criticisms of 
this proposal.  Original intentions originalism runs into problems in 
two situations.  First, there is the problem of inadequate information.  
If what we are after is the semantic intentions of the Framers, then we 
simply do not have the information that we need.  Even if we put 
aside the complex problem of collective intentions yielded by 
multiple drafters and multitudinous ratifiers, we simply do not know 
very much about the semantic intentions of the Framers.  Oh sure, we 
have lots of information—the records of the Convention, the ratifying 
debates, and early debates about the application of the Constitution.  
But all of that is simply more text: if knowledge of semantic 
intentions is necessary to glean meaning, then adding more text to the 
stack of things to be interpreted does not really solve the problem, 
does it?  Second, there is the problem of too much information.  
Sometimes we know more about the Framers‟ intentions than was 
known at the time the Constitution was ratified.  For one thing, we 
have the records of the Philadelphia Convention; the ratifiers did not.  
We have the full record of ratification, but the actual ratifiers had only 
a fragmentary portion of what we have.  To the extent that we know 
more than they did and that knowledge changes our view of the 
Constitution‟s meaning, we are on the road to the conclusion that the 
ratifiers did not know what they were ratifying. 
Both problems suggest that our understanding of constitutional 
meaning should be modeled on Grice‟s conception of sentence 
meaning and not on speaker‟s meaning.  In the case of a constitution, 
speaker‟s meaning (or author‟s meaning) can be redescribed as 
“Framer‟s meaning.”  Framer‟s meaning depends on what the 
Framers intended, given what they knew about contemporary ratifiers 
and interpreter‟s knowledge of their intentions.  Likewise, “sentence 
meaning” can be redescribed as “clause meaning.”  Clause meaning is 
the meaning that would be assigned to a clause, on the assumption 
that the clause was written with the knowledge that it would be 
ratified and interpreted by readers who would have very limited 
access to information about the framing and who would be under 
normative pressure to disregard any information that was not 
universally accessible. 
The meaning of the Constitution is best understood as the clause 
meaning of its provisions.  But this does not entail that history and 
evidence about original meaning is not relevant to the process of 
constitutional interpretation.  Clause meaning is not ahistorical or 
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acontextual.  Linguistic conventions change over time.  Words and 
phrases that once had one public meaning may come, over time, to 
acquire another.  Of course, in the case of the Constitution, the 
Constitution itself acts as a check on this process.  That is because the 
Constitution itself is public, widely available, and central to our legal 
culture.  Constitutional usages are likely to be preserved, simply 
because they are repeated, studied, quoted, and interpreted.  But in 
those cases in which the original public meaning of the Constitution 
has been swept away by a shift in the linguistic winds, the clause 
meaning is the “sentence meaning” that would have been assigned at 
the time the Constitution was ratified and not the sentence meaning 
that we would assign based on contemporary linguistic practices. 
V.  CONCLUSION: HOW TO DO THINGS WITH CLAUSES 
In a sense, Smith‟s Law’s Quandary is about a search for “the 
author”—the person or transcendent being who could supply the 
semantic intentions necessary for the law to mean.  That search was 
motivated by the semantic intentions necessity thesis, a thesis that is 
not sustained by Smith‟s arguments.  I have suggested a different 
picture of legal and constitutional meaning—a picture that 
prominently features well-formed expressions and sentence meaning.  
But the picture of meaning that I paint does not exclude the authors.  
Quite the contrary, my picture includes Austinian brushstrokes and 
Gricean hues that highlight the idea that we do things with words and 
the notion that Framers and ratifiers do things with clauses.  
Constitutions are illocutionary acts—they constitute, command, 
forbid, and empower.  But doing things with clauses is tricky.  
Constitutional texting lacks the immediacy and interactivity of instant 
messaging.  When you try to do things with clauses, the illocutionary 
uptake may occur centuries later in a distant locale.  Constitutional 
text messages address unknown and unknowable readers.  If you want 
your illocutionary act to succeed, then you need to avoid reliance on 
special knowledge of your semantic intentions.  Constitutional text 
messages will work best if they are constructed from widely shared 
public meanings. 
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